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1. Introduction
The main objective of this paper is to analyze the efficiency of a system of management of air pollu-tion by individual licenses distributed to the youth 
with overlapping generations. According to Bonnieux and 
Desaigues [2], there is pollution when the following two 
conditions are met: 
(1) Identification of the effect on the environment 
which can be physical (discharges of the various substanc-
es), biological (effects on mortality of animal species, on 
human health), chemical (acid rains, contamination of the 
environment), noise effect; 
(2) Observation of human reactions which translates a 
dislike, a nuisance, a concern, a discouragement or anxi-
ety, causing a loss of well-being thus disutility. 
Whatever form it takes, air pollution is a negative 
external effect that results in three disabilities according 
to Chanel et al. [5]. First, pollution has direct non-health 
effects such as degradation of sensory perceptions. Next, 
indirect non-health effects like deterioration of the flora 
and fauna may be the consequence of pollution.  Finally, 
pollution has direct health effects such as mortality and 
morbidity (hospitalization and diseases). 
These various effects negatively impact individual util-
ity functions and the collective well-being according to 
their scope as in the case of climate change.  They cause 
an environmental management problem of repairing or 
even eradicating the damage caused by society’s collec-
tive activities.  In this sense, various instruments ranging 
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from consensual to more radical can be applied depending 
on the context. Opinions are divided as to the responsible 
participation of citizens in the management of the envi-
ronment, given that the decisions of the current generation 
will irrevocably have an impact on the well-being of fu-
ture generations. This article aims to analyze the manage-
ment of air pollution by individual transferable licenses 
with overlapping generations (ITL /OG).
The balance of this research is organized as follows. 
Section 2 discusses the various instruments available for 
the management of the environment. Section 3 presents a 
detailed analysis of the of PIT/GI model. Finally, Section 
4 presents our conclusion.
2. Environmental Management Instruments
Environmental management involves the application 
of two main groups of instruments: direct controls and 
incentives (or economic). Direct controls, referred to as 
regulatory instruments, derive from the normative and 
legal approach to environmental policy Prieur [21]. They 
translate into norms, prohibitions, or pressure groups (John 
and Pecchenino [13], John et al. [12], Zhang [25], and Bürgen-
meir [4]). However, they may be the only ones applicable 
in certain urgent cases even though they are criticized for 
the lack of incentive for the emitter of the pollution to re-
duce its discharges (Beaumais and Chiroleu-Assouline [1]). 
The norm in particular is sometimes criticized because of 
its arbitrary and one-sided nature. It degrades the compet-
itiveness of some companies causing fraud or relocation.
Incentive instruments, also known as economic instru-
ments, result in taxes, subsidies or royalties. Taxes have 
the added advantage of generating revenue for govern-
ments.  By contrast, subsidies are awarded to polluters as 
compensation for the loss of earnings caused by the lim-
itation of their production, the source of emission of pol-
lutants. It is widely recognized that economic instruments, 
once accepted, are easier to apply than the standards. That 
is because polluters may find it beneficial to innovate in 
order to decrease pollution and profit from the ensuing 
financial incentives1. On the other hand, taxes almost nev-
er result in a reduction in the volume of the pollution for 
which no threshold is fixed a priori and present the risk of 
degrading the purchasing power of consumers by affect-
ing selling prices. 
The market for the right to pollute is another instrument 
of environmental management. It was proposed by Dales 
[6] and consists of issuing titles (certificates or permits or 
quotas) each containing the right to emit a certain quantity 
of pollutants. In principle, obtaining a certificate is subject 
to a price expressing the social costs in monetary value. 
The market is established between economic actors who 
sell and buy the certificates. The total volume of pollution 
to be rejected is fixed in advance. The freedom of choice 
is thus respected, and the industrialists return to their usu-
al activities of exchange (Bürgenmeir [4]). This principle 
is called blasphemous by some actors. In addition, agents 
may purchase permits with the sole purpose of erecting 
barriers to entry into the market or curbing productive ac-
tivity by hoarding them (Vallée [24]). The establishment of 
emission permits is not primarily about creating a right to 
pollute where there was none. On the contrary, this right 
is restricted whereas, if not, it was unlimited (De Perthu-
is and Boccon-Gibord [7]). The environmental regulator 
is the only authority to set the overall emission ceiling. 
Permits can be distributed for free or for a fee. The free 
distribution made according to the past level of emissions 
is known as the grandfathering method whereas the one 
made according to the past level of production of a refer-
ence period is called the benchmarking method (Schwartz 
[22]).
These instruments have in common the repair of the 
environmental damage by the one who causes it, it is 
the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP).  PPP is the principle 
of internalization that enjoys the greatest acceptability 
because it restores the truth about costs rather than sim-
ply accounting for individual charges (Bürgenmeir [4]). It 
aims at internalizing external costs in the calculation of 
production costs. This involves ensuring that the producer 
includes in his costs all the expenses related to the preven-
tion, control and reduction of pollution. The effectiveness 
of this principle, described as "politically correct" (Godard 
[9]), is not always accepted by environmental advocates. 
By paying, the polluter is not encouraged to reduce his 
emissions because his behavior is likely driven by the sign 
of his marginal profit. Some advocate that the market sys-
tem for permits, which also allows the polluter to pay in 
advance, is preferable to the PPP in its strict sense. Unlike 
taxes, license exchange markets offer those interested in 
working for the environment the opportunity to do so by 
buying and retiring permits. Ethics based on a postulate 
of freedom and sovereignty (Mekni [17]) recommends the 
authorization of citizens to participate in the market. The 
quality of the environment of interest to all several sectors 
of the economy and several human generations. To this 
end, it constitutes general equilibrium conundrum.
1   Some environmental defenders blame subsidies for attracting polluters rather than dissuading them (Vallée [24]). 
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John and Pecchenino [13] developed a general equilibri-
um model with environment and overlapping generations. 
Agents derive satisfaction from the consumption of a 
physical good as well as the quality of the environment. 
However, their consumption degrades the quality of the 
environment to be transmitted to future generations. Each 
agent accumulates capital and environmental quality. 
There is then an arbitration between saving and maintain-
ing the environment. Increasing savings benefits future 
generations through the returns it provides. This decision, 
on the other hand, leads to a decrease in environmental 
quality concomitantly with an increase in consumption.
Michel et al. [19] established another growth model with 
a natural environment. Environmental problems are those 
of pollution or the exploitation of natural resources. They 
affect current and future generations. In the area of  renew-
able natural resources, Mahé and Ropars [16] demonstrated 
the effectiveness of the system of individual transferable 
quotas (ITQs) rather than regulation by restricting a factor 
of production on the farm. Jouvet and Rotillon [14] reached 
the same conclusion by adding a system of overlapping 
generations in the case of the exploitation of a common 
renewable natural resource.
For the specific case of the environment, Prieur [21] ana-
lyzed the management of pollution by a central regulatory 
agency through permits. This author, however, does not 
analyze the case of individual transferable quotas. Also, in 
Prieur’s approach, households participate in the pollution 
permit market by purchasing them rather than receiving 
them free of charge. The effectiveness of the principle 
of individualization of rights has also been demonstrated 
by Buisson and Barnley [3]. Their study showed that the 
importance of ITQs for the sustainable management of 
fisheries resources in France lies first in their individual 
character and then in their transferability. But their model 
did not have overlapping generations.
Inspired by John and Pecchenino [13], John et al. [12], and 
Zhang [25], Fodha [8] also analyzed pollution management 
in an overlapping generations model and found that when 
depollution activity is within the reach of households 
through a trade-off between physical capital and green 
capital, individual commitment is not always enough to 
return to the standard of efficiency. Individual concerns 
are rather motivated by a selfish argument. The participa-
tion of other stakeholders interested in the environment 
such as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) may be 
considered.
The participation of environmental NGOs in the emis-
sion permit market consists of the purchase and with-
drawal of permits. In this way, they hope to cause tariffs 
to become scarcer so as to cause their prices to rise and 
encourage firms to make more clean-up efforts. However, 
these NGOs do not always have enough resources com-
pared to issuers (Kollmus and Lazarus [15]).  Noticeably, 
Mekni [17] discourages citizen participation in license mar-
kets for the following three reasons:
1) because the environment is a public good by reason 
of the rationality and egoism, stowaway behavior is a like-
ly outcome. 
2) if the emission permits were initially allocated to the 
polluters, each citizen will embrace stowaway behavior by 
not buying or by purchasing too few licenses, relying on 
others to fight against pollution;
3) if permits are initially allocated to citizens, everyone 
is encouraged to sell most of their permits, thus relying on 
others to fight against pollution.
The auction of emission permits allows the formation 
of a market price and helps the disclosure of private in-
formation held by the regulatory agent. It also avoids the 
problem of dealing with companies that close and disad-
vantages a wait-and-see behavior (Schwartz [22]). Howev-
er, free distribution is the most widely used medium for 
allocating emission permits (Svendsen [23], Hanoteau [10], 
and Schwartz [22]). The free allocation is proof of accep-
tance by issuers to be subject to the licensing market. It 
favors the transition from a situation where the pollutant 
is not regulated to a situation where it becomes (Schwartz 
[22]).
Unlike noise pollution, air pollution accumulates and 
as a result, it impacts the quality of the environment trans-
ferred in an intergenerational framework. It would there-
fore be interesting to empower each individual citizen 
in the management of the common natural asset. In this 
sense, the following section proposes to analyze this form 
of participation of each citizen in the management of air 
pollution by means of permits received at an early age and 
freely sold only at retirement to polluters or to the future 
generation.
3. Individual Transferable Licenses with 
Overlapping Generations and Capital
The assumptions of the model are first presented before 
analyzing its results.
3.1 The Assumptions of the Model
It is assumed a production economy with pollution in 
which an official entity is responsible for the management 
of the environment as in the case of Prieur [20]. We assume 
in each period a free distribution of all licenses to young 
people rather than sell them. There is no distribution of 
environmental rent. Each consumer lives two periods. 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/jesr.v2i1.449
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During the first period, he/she is active and his/her in-
come consists of a salary. Retirement occurs in the second 
period of life and income is drawn from the sale of the 
permits owned and the return on monetary savings accu-
mulated during the active period. The environmental regu-
lator establishes a principle by means of a code rendering 
the permits issued non-transferable. Thus, only a young 
person can buy permits, but he /she can only sell them in 
retirement. The purpose of this provision is to be able to 
postpone licensing for a period of time and thus delay the 
emission of pollutants. In more detail, the model is based 
on the following conditions:
• the maximum amount of pollution to be emitted by a 
nation is set by international environmental organizations 
(FME, IUCN, UN, etc., for example). At each date ( )t , 
the regulator converts this volume by issuing a quantity tP  
of pollution permits which is distributed to the young peo-
ple of the period;
• at each date ( )t , a generation of tN  identical indi-
viduals are born. The population grows at the constant 
rate of ( )n . Thus, ( ) 11t tN n N −= + ;
• in a competitive sector, firms use physical capital (K), 
environment (E) and labor (L) to produce a quantity of 
goods that equals (Y);
Production is defined by: 
( ) ( ), , 1t t t tY F K E L= 
for every i  , 0iiF < and for  every j i≠ , 0ijF >
At the level tP of the environment, the volume of pol-
lution is noted and is part of the dynamics:
( ) ( )1 1 2t t t tP P R P E− −= − + 
• R ( ) is the function of recycling the environment 
with ( )0 0R = ;
It exists 0P >
  such as: ( )' 0; R P =

( ) ( )' '0 if  and R 0 if P>PR P P P P> < <
  ;
There is ( ) as 0;Z P R Z Z> =

is the stable equi-
librium of the natural environment in the absence of any 
pollutant discharge;
tE : the emission of pollutants (in giga grams) during 
the productive activities of firms.
The agent's salary tω is recorded during the active pe-
riod. This income is divided between:
• the consumption of a homogeneous final good tc ;
• the constitution of monetary savings ts ;
• the purchase of a quantity 1tp − of emission permits 
from the old of the period at the unit price of tq  : 
( )1   3t t tQ q p −=   
So, we have: ( )  4= + + t t t tc s Qω
The number of permits received by each young person 
is denoted as tp , so we have:
( ) 5tt
t
Pp N= 
The total number of permits each youth has at time 
( )t becomes:
( )1  6t t tp p−Ω = +   ; 0tΩ >
The conditions for optimum growth are deduced as ex-
plained below.
3.2 The Social Optimum
Consumer preferences are represented by the utility func-
tion:
( ) ( )1 1,P , ,P  7  + += t t t t tU U c d
Uc <0, Up<0 and Ucp <0
( )U  is strictly concave, twice differentiable and sat-
isfies the conditions of Inada:
( ) ( ) ( )' '0 0;  0  et 0U U U= = ∞ ∞ =
1td + : consumption of the agent born in ( )t at the sec-
ond period (retirement), one has:
( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1 11   8+ + + + + + = + + − Ω  t t t t t t t td T s qα φ α
1 :tT + the capitalization factor (or return) of the savings 
invested in ( )1t + ;
[ ]1 0,1tα + ∈  is the coefficient of distribution of per-
mits between the production process (firms) and the sale 
to the future generation. Therefore,
• when the agent sells all his licenses to the future gen-
eration at the unit price of 1 1, then 0t tq α+ + = ;
• on the other hand, when the agent sells all his licenses 
to firms at the unit price of 1 1, then 1t tφ α+ + = .
1tP+  : the volume of pollution in the period ( )1t + ;
The regulator maximizes the sum of the utilities of 
the generations considering a discount rate ] [0,1γ ∈  to 
ensure optimal growth. At the macroeconomic level, in 
equilibrium one must check the equality between total 
consumption, investment demand and total production, 
that the following equality must hold:
  ( ) ( )1 1, ,  9t t t t t t t t tY F K E L N c N d K− += = + + 
td   : consumption of retirees of the period ( )t ;
1tK + : the capital stock in ( )1t + .
The regulator's program consists in maximizing the 
welfare of the agents by choosing consumption levels 
 and t tc d , polluting emissions tE under the constraints 
of the production and the quality of the environment (vol-
ume of pollution). From the utility function ( )7  and the 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/jesr.v2i1.449
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model accumulation variables, which are the capital tK
and the quality of the environment tP , we set the follow-
ing program:
( )
1
1 1
1 1
t
t t
t
t t t t t t
t t t t
Max N U
Y N c N d Ks
c P P R P E
γ
∞
=−
− +
− −
= + +
 = − +
∑
The Lagrangian of this program is as follows.
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ){ }
( ) ( ) ( )( ){ }
( )
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1 1 1 1 2 2 1
,P , ,P
      ,P , ,P
       ,P , ,P
−
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − −
+ + − + − −
+
+ + + + + + + +
= + − − − + − + − +
+ − − − + − + − +
+
t
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
t
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
t
t t t t t t t t
L N U c d Y N c N d K P P R P E
N U c d Y N c N d K P P R P E
N U c d Y
γ λ µ
γ λ µ
γ λ ( ) ( )( ){ }1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1+ + + + + + +− − − + − + −t t t t t t t t t tN c N d K P P R P Eµ
( ) ( ) ( );  1 ,  and 1j j t t tλ = − + the Lagrange multipli-
ers associated with the stock of production;
 ( ) ( ) ( );  1 ,  and 1j j t t tµ = − + : the Lagrange mul-
tipliers associated with the volume of pollution.
After resolution, as conditions of first order we have:
•  Optimal consumption of young people of the peri-
od ( )t
( ) ( )0 10∂ ∂= ⇒ =
∂ ∂

t
t
t t
L U
c c
λ
•  The optimal consumption of old people of the peri-
od ( )t
( ) ( )10 11−∂ ∂= ⇒ =
∂ ∂

t
t
t t
L U
d d
γλ
•  The optimal emission of pollutants for production 
needs
( ) ( )0 12∂ = ⇒ =
∂

tt E t
t
L
F
E
λ µ
These conditions should be used to characterize the 
various transactions made in the economy from the previ-
ous Lagrangian:
•  The transaction between generations stems 
from ( ) ( )10  and 11 :
 ( )1 13t t
t t
U U
c d
γ −
∂ ∂
=
∂ ∂

•  The intertemporal distribution of consumption
( )11
1
14tt t
t
Y
K
γλ λ++
+
∂
=
∂
•  Arbitration between the quality of the environment 
and the consumption of physical good:
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
' 1
1
10 1 15
1
−
+
 ∂ ∂ ∂
= ⇒ = − − +  ∂ + ∂ ∂ 

t t
t t t t
t t t
L U UR P N
P n P P
µ γµ
γ
( ) ( )1 1
1 1
0 16+ +
+ +
∂ ∂
= ⇒ =
∂ ∂

t
t
t t
L U
c c
λ
( ) ( )
1
1 11
1 1 1 1
1 1
0 0 17
t
t tt
t t t E t
t t
L Y F
E E
γ λ γ µ λ µ
+
+ ++
+ + + +
+ +
∂ ∂
= ⇒ − = ⇒ =
∂ ∂

The implicit price dynamics  and t tλ µ are obtained as 
follows considering the conditions of positivity: 
( )1 0 and 0 t tK P t+ ≥ ≥ ∀
( )
1
From 0,
t
L
K +
∂
=
∂
we get  
( ) ( )
11 1 1 1
, , 18
tt t K t t t
F K E Nλ γλ
++ + + +
= 
( )From 0,
t
L
P
∂
=
∂
we get 
( )( ) ( ) ( )
' 1
1
11 19
1
t t
t t t t
t t
U UR P N
n P P
µ γ µ
γ
−
+
 ∂ ∂
= − − +  + ∂ ∂ 

The transversality condition (Michel [19]) is: 
( ) ( )1 1lim 0 20t t t t tt K Pγ λ µ − −→∞ + = 
The individual permit system results in a balancing 
economy as follows.
3.3 The Balance with Individual Transferable Pol-
lution Permits
According to the Cournot-Nash approach, an agent con-
siders the externality corresponding to his decision to sell 
to the firms his licenses by assuming the behavior of the 
other agents ( )1tE +  as a given. The dynamics of pollution 
can be written as follows:
 ( ) ( )1 1 1 21t t t t t tP P R P Eα+ + += − + Ω + 
Each consumer's program is as follows:
( )
( )
( )
1 1 1
1 1
, , ,p ,
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1
,P , ,P
1
max
+ − +
+ +
+ + + + + +
+ + +
 = − −
  = + + − Ω  

= − + Ω +
t t t t t
t t t t
c d s
t t t t
t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t
U c d
c s Q
d T s q
P P R P E
α
ω
α φ α
α
The Lagrangian of this program is as follows:
 
( ) ( ) { }
( ){ }
( ){ }
1 1 1 1
2 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 1 1 1
,P , ,P
           1
          
+ + −
+ + + + + +
+ + +
= + − + + +
 − − + − Ω + 
− + − Ω −
t t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t
L U c d c s p q
d T s q
P P R P E
λ ω
λ α φ α
λ α
1 2 3,  and λ λ λ  the multipliers of Lagrange.
The first order conditions resulting from the resolution 
are:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/jesr.v2i1.449
23
Journal of Economic Science Research | Volume 02 | Issue 01 | January 2019
Distributed under creative commons license 4.0
•  
( ) ( )10 22
∂ ∂
= ⇒ = −
∂ ∂

t
t t
L U
c c
λ
•  
( ) ( )1 2 1 1 2 1 2 10 0 23tt t t
t t
L UT T T
s c
λ λ λ λ λ+ + +
∂ ∂
= ⇒ − = ⇒ = ⇒ = −
∂ ∂

•  
( ) ( )1 12 2
1 1 1
0 0 24t t
t t t
L U U
d d d
λ λ+ +
+ + +
∂ ∂ ∂
= ⇒ + = ⇒ = −
∂ ∂ ∂

•  
( ) [ ]2 1 2 1 3
1
0 0t t t t
t
L
qλ φ λ λ
α + ++
∂
= ⇒ − + Ω − Ω =
∂
[ ] [ ]12 1 1 3 3 1
1
0 tt t t t
t
Uq q
d
λ φ λ λ φ++ + + +
+
∂
⇒ − − = ⇒ = −
∂
•  
( ) 1 1
3 3
1 1 1
0 0t t
t t t
L U U
P P P
λ λ+ +
+ + +
∂ ∂ ∂
= ⇒ + = ⇒ = −
∂ ∂ ∂
From  ( ) ( )23  and 24   we get
( )1 1 1
11
1
25
t
t t t
t t
tt t
t
U
U U cT T Uc d
d
+
+ +
++
+
∂
∂ ∂ ∂
= ⇒ =
∂∂ ∂
∂

[ ]13 1
1
t
t t
t
U q
d
λ φ+ + +
+
∂
= −
∂
 
 
[ ] ( )
1
1
1 1
1
1
26
t
t
t t
t
t
U
Pq U
d
φ
+
+
+ +
+
+
∂
∂− = ∂
∂
( )1
1
1
    27
t
t t
tt
t
U
q c
Uq
d
+
+
+
∂
∂= ∂
∂
To simplify, we note: 
t
t
c
t
U U
c
∂
=
∂
 ; 
1
1
1
t
t
d
t
U U
d +
+
+
∂
=
∂
and 
1
1
1
t
t
P
t
U U
P +
+
+
∂
=
∂
The results of ( ) ( ) ( )25 , 26  and 27  make possible 
to establish the relations hereafter.
( )
( )
( )
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 1
28
29
30
t
t
t
t
t
t
c
t
d
c t
d t
P
t t
d
U
T
U
U q
U q
U
q
U
φ
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ +

=


 =


 = +




The arbitration condition ( ) ( )28  and 29 is derived 
from the distribution of savings between capital and per-
mits: ( )1 1 31t t
t
q T
q
+
+= 
The condition of arbitration ( )30  is drawn between 
the users of the permits. Let’s recall that 
1tP
U
+
<0 because 
it is a disutility. [ ]1 1 0t tqφ + +− ≥ shows that, a priori, 
each actor is encouraged to sell to firms with the intention 
of maximizing his gain. This decision favors the deterio-
ration of the quality of the environment, illustrating that 
individual rationality generates collective malaise, that is, 
the tragedy of commons[11]. Air pollution is indeed most 
often a pure public evil. Incentive mechanisms such as 
taxes, subsidies or fees should be instituted to encourage 
the transmission of better environmental quality to the 
next generation.
When 
1
0
tP
U
+
= prices become equal and the agent be-
comes indifferent between selling his licenses to firms and 
to the future generation.
In the case of firms for which the objective is profit 
maximization, we have:
 ( ) ( ), , 32t t t t t t t t t tF K E L r K E Lπ φ ω= − − − 
Where ,   and t t tr φ ω is return on capital, unit price of 
pollution permits, and salary, respectively. At the competi-
tive equilibrium, we have:
•  ( ) ( ), ,   33t K t t tr F K E L=   ;
•  ( ) ( ), ,  34t E t t tF K E Lφ =   ;
•  ( ) ( ), ,  35t L t t tF K E Lω =  .
The balance of the studied economy covers four mar-
kets namely: labor market, pollution permits, physical 
assets and capital. In each of these markets we are looking 
for equality between supply and demand. More concretely 
we have:
•  In the labor market: at each date, under the assump-
tion of an inelastic labor supply, the number of employees 
is equal to the number of young people in the economy 
( )36t tL N=  ,
•  On the pollution permit market: in equilibrium, the 
number of permits requested by firms must be equal to the 
number directly offered by the old to the production pro-
cess, hence:
( ) ( )1 2 1 37t t t t tE N p pα− − −= + 
For licenses that are not exploited by firms and are 
therefore transferred to the next generation, the supply of 
old people of the period must be equal to the demand of 
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the young of the same period, hence: 
( )( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 11 38− − − −
− − 
− + = = = 
 

t t tt
t t t t t t t t
t t
c sQN p p N N N p
q q
ω
α
•  In the physical goods market: the macroeconomic 
balance assumes the equality between total consumption, 
investment demand and total output from where: 
( ) ( )1 1, ,L 39t t t t t t t t tY F K E N c N d K− += = + + 
•  On the capital market (balanced under the Walras 
law): investor demand is satisfied by the savings of old 
people constituted when they were active: 
( )1 1 40t t tK N s− −= 
For a level tP  a balance of the economy is then defined 
as a sequence of:
•  prices   ( ), , , 0t t tr tφ ω ≥  ;
• variables per capita ( )1 1 1, ,p , ,− + +t t t t tc s d meeting 
the budgetary constraints and the conditions of the eco-
nomic agent's first order;
• ( ), , , 0t t tK E L t ≥ aggregated variables satisfying 
the first order conditions ( ) ( ) ( )33 , 34  and 35  of the 
firms.
Given that the conditions of equilibrium are verified 
and accounting for the dynamics of the pollution, the opti-
mal policy is obtained as explained below.
3.4 The Optimal Policy
In equilibrium, at each period ( )t , each young person 
receives from the regulator a quantity of pollution per-
mits: 
( )5tt
t
Pp
N
= 
•  assuming an inelastic labor supply, at equilibrium in 
this market,
we have: ( )36t tL N= 
•  in the capital market we have: 
( )1 1    40t t tK N s− −= 
•  in the goods market, we have:
  
( )( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1 1 2, ,   41t t t t t t t t t t t tN c N d F N s N p p p N K+ + + − + + ++ = + − − 
•  in the permit market there are two cases:
• the number of permits required by firms must be 
equal to the number offered for production purposes; 
( ) ( )1 2 1 42t t t t tE N p pα− − −= + 
• the number of licenses sold to the future generation 
must be equal to the number surrendered in the specula-
tion:
( )( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 11 43− − − −
− − 
− + = = = 
 

t t tt
t t t t t t t t
t t
c sQN p p N N N p
q q
ω
α
Compared to the prices on the market of the permits 
not allocated to the production of ( ) ( ) ( )29 , 30  and 31
, one draws:
 ( )
1
1 44t
t
c
t t
d
U
q q
U
+
+ = 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )1
1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1
,P , ,P
, , 45
,P , ,Pt
P t t t t
t E t t t t t t t
d t t t t
U c d
q F N s N p p p N
U c d+
+ +
+ − + +
+ +
= + − + 
Thus 
( )( ) ( )
11 1 1 1
, , 46
tt t K t t t t t t t
q q F N s N p p p N
++ − + +
= + − 
At the intertemporal equilibrium, the dynamics of pol-
lution deviate:
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 47t t t t t t tP P R P N p p p+ − += − + + − 
We can now study the stationary equilibrium of the 
economy.
3.5 Stationary Balance
Given a stable level of a policy of individual transferable 
pollution permits:
( )ˆP Np R P= <  the stock of capital is given by the 
sum of the savings ( )   48K Ns=  and by 
1
1
t
t
t
q T
q
+
+= one draws the golden rule: 
( )* 1 49T = 
Indeed, in the stationary state, 1 1
t
t
t
q T
q
+
+= becomes: 
 1q T
q
= =  This factor of interest must correspond to the 
marginal productivity of capital.
Starting from ( )1 1 1t t t t tE N p p p+ − += + − , we infer 
that stationary equilibrium agents assign to firms the num-
ber of permits that have been distributed to them by the 
planner, hence: ( )1 1t t t tN p p p E− ++ − =  . 
( )1 1t t t tN p p p− ++ − becomes: ( )N p p p Np+ − =
;from where ( )   50E Np= 
In this case, the stable level of pollution is deduced 
from: ( )1 1t t t tP P R P E− −= − +
becomes: ( )P P R P E= − +   from where: ( )R P E= 
And we have: 
( ) ( )*   51R P Np= 
The price of permits in the financial market, from 
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( )45 becomes:
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
* ,, ,    52
,
P
E
d
U d Np
q F K Np N
U d Np
= + 
From (9), the stationary consumption level be-
comes ( )* * , ,Nc Nd F K Np N K+ = −
At stationary equilibrium, one can attain the maximum 
possible utility of the economy. It is recalled that the cen-
tral regulator's objective is to maximize the well-being 
of agents under the constraints of existing economic re-
sources by choosing the optimal level of consumption, the 
quality of the environment and the level of capital. To do 
this, we ask the following program:
( )
( )
( )
, ,P,
,P, ,P
, ,
max
 + + =

=
c d K
NU c d
Nc Nd K F K Np N
R P Np
The Lagrangian of this program is as follows:
 ( ) ( ) ( ){ } ( ){ }1 2,P, ,P , ,= + − − − + −L NU c d F K Np N Nc Nd K R P Npλ λ
The resolution gives the following first order conditions 
with 1λ and 2λ designating the Lagrange multipliers.
•   ( )
10
∂ ∂
= ⇒ =
∂ ∂
L U
c c
λ
•  ( )
10
∂ ∂
= ⇒ =
∂ ∂
L U
d d
λ
( )** **    53c d
U U U U
c d
∂ ∂
= ⇔ =
∂ ∂

( )** : refers to the optimal social solution.
•  ( )
20
∂ ∂
= ⇒ =
∂ ∂ E
L U F
E c
λ
•  ( ) 0∂ = ⇒
∂
L
P
( ) ( )' 0   54E
U UN F R P
P c
∂ ∂
+ =
∂ ∂
•  ( ) ( )**0 1 1 55
∂
= ⇒ = ⇒ =
∂
K K
L
F F
K
The optimal level of licenses distributed P**, is de-
duced from ( )54 .
The optimal level of permits to be issued takes into ac-
count all the technological conditions of the economy. In 
fact, by comparing equations ( ) ( ) ( )52 , 53  and 54  we 
have:
( ) ( )( )
* ,, ,
,
P
E
d
U d Np
q F K Np N
U d Np
= +
( )
( ) ( )
'
' '
0 with :  ;  one obtains:
1
E
E E
U U U UF R P N
c P c d
U
U U PF R P N F R P Uc P N
d
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
+ = =
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
∂
∂ ∂ ∂= − ⇒ − = ∂∂ ∂
∂
   
( )
( )
,
,
P
E
d
U d Np
F
U d Np
+
  becomes 
( ) ( )' '1 11E E EF F R P F R PN N
   − = −   
   
( ) ( )* ' 11   56Eq R P FN
 = − 
 

* :q sale price of permits to future generation to delay 
pollution;
* :EF φ= sale price of permits directly to firms by re-
tirees causing emissions of pollutants through the produc-
tion process.
It can be seen that when * *q φ≤ , economic actors will 
prefer to sell to firms rather than to the next generation. 
Therefore, their individually rational decisions will cause 
pollution which constitutes a nuisance and causes every-
one suffer from the negative effect of pollution. There 
is also a need for a subsidy or fee to mitigate the con-
sequences of uncooperative agent behavior. Finally, the 
individualization and transferability of pollution permits 
cannot be a substitute for other pollution management in-
struments. These results lead to the following conclusion.
4. Conclusion
The quality of the environment can be managed 
through regulatory or economic instruments. It is in this 
sense that the Polluter Pays Principle, an economic instru-
ment, is prescribed. This principle does suffer from many 
limitations. A priori, the issuer will just pay without wor-
rying about the volume of pollution it emits. To mitigate 
these shortcomings, these instruments, whether regulatory 
or economic, must be underpinned by other incentives in 
order to transmit a better quality of the environment to fu-
ture generations. This article shows that the free distribu-
tion of emission permits to young people of a period with 
the possibility for them to opt for physical goods or the 
quality of the environment does not constitute a sufficient 
policy for an intergenerational altruism. This behavior is 
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explained by the non-cooperation of actors making neces-
sary incentives such as taxes or subsidies.
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